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Abstract
The report attempts of apply econophysics con-
cepts to the Eurozone crisis. It starts by examining
the idea of conservation laws as applied to mar-
ket economies. It formulates a measure of financial
entropy and gives numerical simulations indicating
that this tends to rise. We discuss an analogue
for free energy released during this process. The
concepts of real and symbolic appropriation are in-
troduced as a means to analyse debt and taxation.
We then examine the conflict between the con-
servation laws that apply to commodity exchange
with the exponential growth implied by capital ac-
cumulation and how these have necessitated a se-
quence of evolutionary forms for money, and go on
to present a simple stochastic model for the forma-
tion of rates of interest and a model for the time
evolution of the rate of profit.
Finally we apply the conservation law model to
examining the Euro Crisis and the European Sta-
bility pact, arguing that if the laws we hypothesise
actually hold, then the goals of the stability pact
are unobtainable.
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1 Conservation laws in mar-
ket exchange
In the physical sciences conservation laws provide
a basic framework within which theories are cast.
They are so fundamental that it is hard to conceive
of any mathematically expressed system of mechan-
ics that does not rest on such laws.
Do similar laws exist in economic theory?
In a sense yes, where they are termed ‘accounting
identities’ and regarded as something pretty triv-
ial. We want to argue that this view of them as
something trivial is misplaced, and that they can
actually tell us a lot more about the nature of social
relations and their degree of constrainedness than
is generally realised.
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Marx, to an extent greater than is sometimes
recognised, wanted to establish a theory of the cap-
italist economy informed by the laws of physics.
[3, ch. 2] This comes across in several ways: his
avowed aim to write a book on the ‘laws of mo-
tion’ of capitalism; his distinction between the con-
cept of labour and labour power; his presentation of
value as the crystalisation of human energy; and his
analysis of commodity exchange as an equivalence
relation.
Marx said that in Capital he was investigating
the ‘laws of motion’ of capitalism. This might
be understood as only a metaphor derived from
physics, but we think that it is worth taking it
seriously. If you think of the time he was writ-
ing – the 1860s – one of the key recent discover-
ies of physics was the idea of the conservation of
energy. The conservation of energy had been for-
malised by Helmholtz and Grove in the late 1840s.
This held that although energy might appear in
various forms: heat, motion, gravitational poten-
tial, it was conserved in its exchange between these
forms.1
Marx’s initial argument in Capital, before he de-
rives labour power as the source of surplus value
is similar. Value is neither created nor destroyed
in the exchange process, but can only change its
form. His argument asserts in effect a law of the
conservation of value in exchange.
Think of the distinction between ‘labour’ and
‘labour power’. This is so closely parallels Watt’s
distinction between ‘work’ and ‘power’, that it is
surprising that the similarity is rarely remarked
on.2 His analysis of commodity exchange is also
structured like an analysis of a conservation law
[20]. He introduces as an example
20 yards of linen = 1 coat or 20 yards of linen are
worth 1 coat,
in this notation he says that the coat plays the role
of the equivalent and that it implies also the con-
verse relation
1“What Lucretius says is self-evident; ‘nil posse creari de
nihilo,’ out of nothing, nothing can be created. Creation of
value is transformation of labour-power into labour. Labour-
power itself is energy transferred to a human organism by
means of nourishing matter.” [20, ch. 9]
2This need not have been via a direct study of Watt by
Marx. Watt’s distinction between work done and power: the
ability to perform work, measured in standard horse-powers
had become a commonplace of industrial society.
1 coat = 20 yards of linen or 1 coat is worth 20
yards of linen.
He then presents what he calls the expanded form
of the relation
20 yards of linen = 1 coat
20 yards of linen = 10 lbs of tea, etc.
And goes on from this to state that 1 coat will
be equal to 10 lbs tea. What he is doing here is set-
ting out what in modern mathematical terminology
is an equivalence relation. For some relational op-
erator + we say that + is an equivalence relation if
the relations is commutative, transitive and reflex-
ive, that is
• if a + a
• and if a + b implies b + a
• and if a + b and b + c implies a + c
then the relation + is an equivalence relation. In
his case + would stand for exchange of commodi-
ties. Now equivalence relations are interesting be-
cause systems goverened by conservation laws dis-
play them. Thus in a many-body gravitational
problem with a predefined collection of particle
masses, the set of possible configurations of parti-
cle position and velocities is partitioned into equiv-
alence sets with respect to energy. Within each set
all configurations share the same total energy and
the conservation of energy prevents transitions of
configurations between these sets.
This is in essence what we understand by a con-
servation law.
We infer the existence of energy as a conserved
quantity by the fact that, in closed systems, we
never observe transitions between configurations
with different total energies.
Marx’s demonstration that commodity exchange
is an equivalence relation is then used to infer that
there is a conserved quantity ‘value’, the sum of
which is unchanged under the operation of ex-
changes. Commodity exchange is governed by a
conservation law. To borrow much later terminol-
ogy, exchange is shown to be a zero-sum game.
This may seem a trivial observation, but it leads
to an important deduction: that in a conservative
system, any surplus of value – profit – must arise
from outside of the system and thus that profit
must originate from production rather than ex-
change. Marx argued that the conserved quantity
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in commodity exchanges is human energy expended
as labour and that this energy provides the exter-
nal input that allows a surplus. At the economy’s
two ends, production and consumption, the process
is nonconservative but in between them lies market
exchange: a conservative system.
1.1 Finance and conservation laws
Although economists are sometimes dismissive of
conservation laws, disparagingly called ‘accounting
identities’, these identities can still throw useful
light on the financial crisis that has been unfold-
ing these last few years. But to do this we need to
uncover the specific laws of motion, that is to say
both the conservation laws and the particle dynam-
ics that govern the financial system.
That we have to think of the financial system us-
ing tools derived from statistical mechanics should
be obvious by now. It is over a quarter of a century
since it was shown that the regulation of prices by
labour content arises directly from statistical me-
chanical considerations [11].
If we look at the more recent work on the statisti-
cal mechanics of money [8, 10], we can see a similar
structure of argumentation – pushed somewhat by
the use of more sophisticated physics. This research
argues that if we treat trades between commodity
owners as a random process that conserves money,
then you can use statistical mechanics to make de-
ductions about the distribution of money. Money
as a conserved quantity randomly transfered in ex-
changes between agents, models the transfer of en-
ergy between gas molecules and it follows that the
maximum entropy distribution of money will be a
Gibbs-Boltzmann one. The statistical mechanics of
money shows that this distribution fits the observed
distribution of money for most of the population,
but that a small minority of very rich people fall
off this distribution – their wealth follows a power-
law. The Gibbs distribution falls of sharply at high
levels of wealth, whereas the the tail of the power
law distribution extends much further.
The probability of anyone being as rich as Bill
Gates or Warren Buffet as a result of simple com-
modity trading is vanishingly small, so [9, 24] con-
clude that there has to be some mechanism outside
of equivalent exchange that gives rise to their ex-
traordinary wealth: the effect of compound interest
which is a non-random process.
Research in agent-based modeling has shown
that if you partition the population into buyers and
sellers of labour power and run agent-based simu-
lations, you a reproduce the combination of Gibbs
and power-law distributions of wealth [32] observed
in real capitalist economies [9, 24]. Further, when
producers can specialise in and switch between dif-
ferent commodity-types, Marx’s law of labour value
appear as an emergent phenomenon from local and
distributed market exchanges [33].
1.2 The phase space of finance
A basic tool of conceptual analysis in statistical me-
chanics is the concept of phase space. If you con-
sider a collection of particles (for example stars) in
a closed volume, each particle can be described by 6
numbers which specify its position and momentum
in terms of a three-dimensional Cartesian coordi-
nate system: 3 numbers to specify the position and
3 numbers to specify its momentum. We say that
each particle has 6 degrees of freedom.
So if we have a million particles, for instance if
one is considering the dynamics of a galaxy, the
system has 6 million degrees of freedom and we can
consider these to be a coordinate system such that
every possible configuration of molecular positions
and moments constitutes a point in this 6 million
dimensional space. We call such a space a phase
space. The laws of motion then specify a trajectory
of the whole system through this phase space.
The overall system is governed by conservation
laws. The mass is conserved, and relative to the
center of gravity of the system as a whole the sum
of the momenta in each of the directions of our
Cartesian system must sum to zero.
Why is this relevant to finance?
Well we are again dealing with a system with
very large numbers of agents and we have analogues
of position and momentum. The total debt/credit
position of an agent is analogous to its mass, and
the rate of change of its debt/credit position is anal-
ogous to its momentum. Thus if two billion people
in the world are enmeshed in debt/credit relations
then the whole system can be thought of as a phase
space of 2 billion dimensions.
It is impossible to visualise a space with high
numbers of dimensions, so there are graphical tech-
niques that people use to reason about them. One
trick is to project the high dimensional phase space
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down onto only two dimensions: for example, posi-
tion and momentum in the direction of one of the
axes of the coordinate system. This allows one to
create a phase diagram. Applied to the financial
system, a possible phase diagram is shown in Fig-
ure 1.
Increasing Debt
Decreasing Debt
Net Credit Net Debt
a
b
Figure 1: A phase diagram for financial space re-
lating debt to the rate of change of debt. Agent a is
currently a net creditor, but it is borrowing and as
such moving to the right towards becoming a net
debtor. Agent b has debts which it is paying off
and moving to the left to become a net creditor.
We could show every agent (firm, individual,
state) as a point on this plane. Or in a more ab-
stract way we could say that there is a density func-
tion Px,y which gives the probability of finding an
agent in a given area in the phase plane. Using this
probablility density function (PDF) we can formu-
late two conservation laws analogous to the conser-
vation of mass and momentum.
i. The total ‘mass’ on the left of the origin equals
the mass on the right of the origin. Since the
mass to the left is credit, and that to the right
is debt, this is another way of saying that the
total debt and total credit must balance.
0 =
∞∫
−∞
xPxdx (1)
ii. The total ‘mass’ above the origin must equal
the mass below the origin, that is to say that
any growth in debt must be compensated for
by a growth in credit. This is an ‘equal and
opposite reaction’ effect.
0 =
∫ ∞
−∞
yPydy (2)
These very basic points establish that there is no
net value or net wealth embodied in the financial
system and that there is no flow of value into or
out of the financial system. It shows the fallacy
of the conception, popular among some political
economists that capital has ‘moved into finance’
because of the low rate of profit pertaining in in-
dustry.
This is a fundamental misconception, capital is
value, and it can not flow into the financial system,
since the sum of value here is always zero. A mo-
ment’s thought about the materiality of value con-
firms this. Real-economic value – what the classi-
cal economists understood to be the labour content
of physical products [22] – can not be converted
into financial instruments which are just informa-
tion structures.
A similar dimensional argument shows the fal-
lacy of the idea of the ‘money supply’ used in ortho-
dox economics. The notion of a supply originates
with physical flows like the supply of water to a
town, or the supply of cars provided by all the car
factories in the world. There are flows in the finan-
cial system, e.g. flows of agents towards greater
debt, but these are exactly balanced by flows to-
wards greater credit positions, so the net flow is
zero. If the term money supply is taken instead to
mean a stock of money, and this is taken to include
bank deposits, one then has the problem that both
negative and positive money exist: liabilities and
assets of the banking system respectively. Taken
as a whole the positive and negative stocks cancel.
We believe it is better to try and understand the
system in terms of its laws of motion. These laws
are both the conservation laws (1) and (2), and the
forces acting on the individual particles (capitalist
firms, states, etc.). We will argue that the degree
of ‘disorder’ or entropy of a financial system tends
to increase over time. We would expect this of any
chaotic system governed by conservation laws, but
an examination of the force fields acting on the par-
ticles will show why this takes place.
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1.3 Tendancy of financial entropy to
rise
With the density function Px,y we can compute the
entropy of a system, denoted H , using the standard
Boltzman formula,
H = −
∫
Px,y lnPx,y dxdy, (3)
and we assert that for a financial system H will rise
over time.
Why does the entropy tend to increase?
First a common-sense explanation. Consider a
collection of firms or enterprises, distributed on the
phase plane diagram as in Figure 1. Each firm can
be considered a particle subject to forces which de-
termine its rate of change of debt. There are three
cases to consider:
(A) A firm whose debt is rising because its profits
are too low even to meet its interest payments
to the banks. Such a firm has to borrow more
from the bank to stay in operation. This firm
is an involuntary borrower.
(B) A firm may be voluntarily borrowing because
it has a high rate of profit, well in excess of the
interest rate, and thus can increase its profit
of enterprise by taking on bank loans to invest
and expand its business.
(C) A firm may reckon that the rate of profit it can
earn is lower than the rate of interest, but its
current debt level may be quite low so that it
is in a position to pay off its debts to the bank
with some of its retained profit. A firm may
even have no net borrowing and find that it
is more profitable to earn interest on its cash
than it is to invest it productively. Such a firm
is a voluntary lender.
The total amount of borrowing must equal to the
total amount of lending, thus if the quantity of vol-
untary borrowing by firms in group (B) falls be-
low the quantity of lending by firms in group (C),
the lack of demand from investments will automat-
ically create sufficient firms in (A) trying to stay in
operation through involuntary borrowing, ensuring
that equation (2) is met. The net effect of this is
to polarise capital in the phase plane as borrowers
and lenders, giving rise to a tadpole shape with a
head of productive firms and a tail of rentier firms,
who earn their revenue from financial rather than
productive assets. Therefore, as the dispersion or
spread of the probability density function increases,
the entropy H rises, representing more disorder.
In previous work [5] we presented a numerical
simulation model based on the methodology devel-
oped in [32] that models a simple capitalist econ-
omy with a large number of capitalists and workers.
The state of indebtedness/credit of each of the cap-
itals is tracked as the economy evolves. The cap-
italists interact via a very simple financial system
represented by a single bank which maintains debit
and credit accounts for agents based on a certain
amount of base money which acts as its reserve.
The evolution can be visualised in a phase plane
diagram. For clarity we normalise the net debt of
each firm by its total capital stock, which is known
as the ‘debt ratio’.3 Similarly the rate of change of
debt is normalised by its total capital stock. Ini-
tially the capitalists are clustered around the origin
of the phase plane diagram, but as time passes the
distribution becomes elongated with head of rela-
tively indebted capitalists and long ‘rentier tail’ of
capitalists with a negative debt ratio. This process
is illustrated in Figure 2. The increase in entropy
of the debt ratio PDF over time is shown.4
The greater is the dispersion of the rates of
profit5 and the smaller the gap between the rate
of profit and the rate of interest, the stronger will
be this polarisation process and the more rapid will
be the growth in financial entropy.6
The polarisation process generates a tadpole
3Note that a firm with a net credit position has a negative
debt ratio, D/K. The capital stock K was calculated from
the current value of the commodity stocks and equipment of
the enterprise.
4Calculated using a per pixel binning of the PDF.
5Technically what we mean here is its coefficient of vari-
ation, its standard deviation relative to its mean.
6As we said earlier the net lending always sums to zero.
As such it is analogous to a motorway with a stream of
cars of equal weight heading past one another at 100kph in
opposite directions. The sum of the momentums of the cars
is zero. But if we square their positive or negative velocities
times their weights we get the energy stored in the traffic.
One can view the sum of the squares of the lending positions
of all agents as a bit like energy in that it does not sum to
zero as the activity of the financial system increases but with
the important proviso, that this quantity is not conserved.
It can grow without immediate limit. We will explain later
why this growth in financial energy leads to crises.
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T PDF in the phase plane Px,y H
2 3.29
5 3.72
20 4.74
Figure 2: The formation of a rentier tail due to
the polarisation of capitals in the phase plane. T
is timestep, H is entropy. The images show a plot
of the probability density function of capitals in
the phase plane. The horizontal axis shows the net
debt, normalised by the total capital stock, i.e., the
‘debt ratio’. The vertical axis shows the rate of
change of the debt, also normalised by total capital
stock. As time passes the entropy of the system in-
creases. Note that the colour is nonlinearly related
to the actual value of Px,y in order to display the
areas of very low but non-zero probability in the
tail.
shape in the phase plane7 with a body of active
firms clustered round the origin and a rentier tail
of firms that progressively enlongates as the sim-
ulation goes on. Why do we get this asymetrical
distribution?
Because the debt ratio of a capitalist can not for
long exceed unity. A capitalist with more debts
than assets is technically bankrupt and will shortly
cease trading. There is on the other hand no limit
to how negative the debt ratio of a capitalist can
be. That is to say, no limit to how much money a
capitalist can have in the bank.
What the argument above shows is that it is
possible to derive a small set of laws of motion
that characterise the basic development of a cap-
italist financial system. The essentials of the phe-
nomenon that has been called ‘financialisation’, i.e.,
the growth of financial assets/liabilities relative to
7It should be noted that so far this conclusion is based
on theoretical arguments and the evidence from numerical
simulations. An empirical investigation of the distribution
of firms on the phase plane remains to be done.
real assets, occurs even in a very simple model. The
entropy of the system will increase, polarisation will
occur, and a rentier class will be precipitated out,
unless social work is done to curtail the growth of
entropy.
In a more complex model with joint stock firms
a similar polarisation will tend to occur, but in this
case there may be pressure for firms with a very
negative debt ratio (lots of cash) to distribute this
to their shareholders.
This distribution is unlikely to put a halt to the
polarisation process because in the case of cash be-
ing distributed from firms to individual capitalists
the total of positive balances with the banking sys-
tem does not change, it just shifts from abstract le-
gal persons to concrete ones. The only mechanism
by which the polarisation can be conservatively re-
duced is by the class of creditor firms and capitalists
to purchase commodities from the class of debtor
firms and capitalists. This will happen only to the
extent that a distribution of money from cash-rich
firms to rentiers results in an increase in the con-
sumption of the rentier class.
Commodity exchange is a conservative system,
i.e., one governed by conservation laws. This does
not apply to taxation. Taxation is a non-equivalent
transfer of value. Heavy taxation of the rentier
class is a form of social work that reduces the en-
tropy of the system.8 The introduction of a regu-
lated or planned economy is an even more powerful
form of social work. In a planned economy the de-
gree of chaos and disorder is reduced and coherent
patterns are established which curb the growth of
entropy characteristic of the free market.
1.4 Relation to the productive econ-
omy
The model above is very simple, it involves no inter-
bank lending nor the issue of any complex financial
instruments. All growth in debt arises from the
behavior of basic actors in the real economy: capi-
talists and workers. But it is still able to generate
the polarisation of the capitalist class into produc-
tive capitalists and financiers.
In a physical system, as it moves from a low en-
tropy state to a high entropy state we are in prin-
8The statistical mechanical effects on money distribution
under different taxation schemes has recently been studied
by [7].
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ciple able extract work from it. Is there any equiv-
alent in the financial system?
Does it release any analogue of free energy as it
evolves?
It is a commonplace observation that an economy
with a low initial level of debt can grow rapidly as
the debt builds up, but what is happening here?
We have said that there is no value absorbed in
or contained in the financial system. The finan-
cial system is an information structure recording
the mutual obligations of agents. But this does not
mean that there may not be real value correlates of
financial relations. If we look at all the firms with
net debt – the integral over the right hand side of
the phase plane in Fig. 1 – then these firms have
all absorbed real resources from the left hand side
of the plane. When capitalists on the bottom half
of the phase plane fail to invest and capitalists on
the top half do invest in excess of their income, the
financial system sets up a system of obligations be-
tween the debtors and the saving capitalists. But
at the same time, the firms on the bottom are pro-
vided with a market for their output on the top of
the phase plane. There a transfer of real commodi-
ties from the bottom to the top.
A firm on the bottom, produces 10,000 buses con-
taining perhaps 100 million hours of labour which
are bought by agents on the top half. In return the
bus company obtains not value but a credit account
at the bank. This is not strictly speaking a com-
modity exchange. A credit account in a bank is not
value. Had they been paid in gold and got back 1
million oz of gold bullion, that would have been a
commodity exchange, an exchange of equivalents,
since the gold would have contained real value: the
human energy, labour, required to make it.
The sale of the buses for say 1,000 million Eu-
ros is a nonequivalent transaction in real terms
since embodied labour is transfered between owners
without a compensating movement of labour in the
other direction. And, by our previous assumption,
it is a transfer between a bus firm who were decid-
ing to save 1,000 million rather than invest it pro-
ductively. This transfer is thus one which would not
have occured in the absence of the credit system.
Had gold coins been the medium of exchange9, the
9The existence of gold as a standard of value is not the
same thing as its use as a medium of exchange. The gold
standard persisted long after commodity circulation was
generally carried out on credit.
million oz of gold would have lain in their safe at
the bus factory and those purchasers who lacked
cash (those who are on the right of the phase plane
diagram in Fig. 1) would not have been able to buy
the buses. The sale would thus never have taken
place, and the total output of buses would have had
to be 10,000 lower. Buses could still have been sold
to firms who had ready cash, but this would have
been a smaller number.
Readers of Marx’s Capital [20] may recall that he
analysed the circulation of commodities as being of
the form
C →M → C,
i.e., commodity, money, commodity. He argues
that this form already contains the possibility of
crisis.10 The potential crisis is caused by the forma-
10“Nothing can be more childish than the dogma, that
because every sale is a purchase, and every purchase a sale,
therefore the circulation of commodities necessarily implies
an equilibrium of sales and purchases. If this means that the
number of actual sales is equal to the number of purchases,
it is mere tautology. But its real purport is to prove that
every seller brings his buyer to market with him. Nothing
of the kind. The sale and the purchase constitute one iden-
tical act, an exchange between a commodity-owner and an
owner of money, between two persons as opposed to each
other as the two poles of a magnet. They form two distinct
acts, of polar and opposite characters, when performed by
one single person. Hence the identity of sale and purchase
implies that the commodity is useless, if, on being thrown
into the alchemistical retort of circulation, it does not come
out again in the shape of money; if, in other words, it can-
not be sold by its owner, and therefore be bought by the
owner of the money. That identity further implies that the
exchange, if it do take place, constitutes a period of rest, an
interval, long or short, in the life of the commodity. Since
the first metamorphosis of a commodity is at once a sale and
a purchase, it is also an independent process in itself. The
purchaser has the commodity, the seller has the money, i.e.,
a commodity ready to go into circulation at any time. No
one can sell unless some one else purchases. But no one is
forthwith bound to purchase, because he has just sold. Cir-
culation bursts through all restrictions as to time, place, and
individuals, imposed by direct barter, and this it effects by
splitting up, into the antithesis of a sale and a purchase, the
direct identity that in barter does exist between the alien-
ation of one’s own and the acquisition of some other man’s
product. To say that these two independent and antithet-
ical acts have an intrinsic unity, are essentially one, is the
same as to say that this intrinsic oneness expresses itself in
an external antithesis. If the interval in time between the
two complementary phases of the complete metamorphosis
of a commodity become too great, if the split between the
sale and the purchase become too pronounced, the intimate
connexion between them, their oneness, asserts itself by pro-
ducing — a crisis. The antithesis, use-value and value; the
contradictions that private labour is bound to manifest it-
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tion of gold hoards, gold which is withdrawn from
circulation and saved. This interruption of the cir-
cuit C → M → C by money lying idle means that
goods can not be sold: ‘No one can sell unless some
one else purchases’.
With credit the circuit C →M → C is replaced
from the standpoint of the seller with one of the
form C → Fa → C where Fa is a financial asset: a
bill of exchange, or a record of credit with a bank.
If both the purchaser and the seller have financial
assets this is the same as the old monetary circula-
tion:
C Fa
ց ր
ր ց
Fa C
The financial asset has just changed places, but if
we have purchase on credit we get:
C Fa
ց ր
ր ց
a† → → C + Fl
Here the purchase is funded by the spontaneous
creation of a financial asset/liability pair by the
debt creation operation a† giving rise to Fa and
Fl. Within this whole process real value is con-
served, since the only real value entering was C
and C leaves having merely changed owner whilst
the liability and asset cancel: Fl + Fa = 0.
The ‘work’ done by credit is thus to allow the
production and distribution of goods embodying
real labour that could not otherwise occur given
the private organisation of production. This is the
free energy extracted by the increase in entropy of
the financial system. Of course the financial system
itself does not do any real work. The real additional
physical work is done by the employees of compa-
nies who are net lenders. The ‘work’ done by by
self as direct social labour, that a particularised concrete
kind of labour has to pass for abstract human labour; the
contradiction between the personification of objects and the
representation of persons by things; all these antitheses and
contradictions, which are immanent in commodities, assert
themselves, and develop their modes of motion, in the anti-
thetical phases of the metamorphosis of a commodity. These
modes therefore imply the possibility, and no more than the
possibility, of crises. The conversion of this mere possibility
into a reality is the result of a long series of relations, that,
from our present standpoint of simple circulation, have as
yet no existence.” [20, ch. 2, sec. 2]
the credit system is social, it is work to overcome
the potential barrier that private property would
otherwise impose on the expansion of production.
Commodity exchange requires and exchange of
equivalents. Where these equivalents are not in the
hands of the purchasers, the financial system al-
lows transfers that are in real terms non-equivalent
exchanges, whilst creating instead a symbolic rec-
ompensation for the seller.
This symbolic recompensation in Euros or Dol-
lars is a theoretical command over future labour.
The borrower in this case is the real appropriator
of the labour value embodied in the capital goods
they acquire. The lender obtains merely a formal
or symbolic appropriation of value.
Private ownership creates a potential barrier to
the movement of goods which credit overcomes.
The increasing entropy of the financial system re-
flects the ‘work’ that has been extracted in over-
coming this barrier and is why it appears to ‘create
wealth’. It allows the creation of wealth by labour
whose expenditure would otherwise have been in-
hibited by the private organisation of the economy.
If one were to ask a banker what productive role
they paid in the economy the answer would proba-
bly be in terms of the banks providing the finance
that the economy needs.11 Money according to
Adam Smith is the ability to command the labour
of others.12 The provision of credit gives a capi-
11“Now let’s turn to the purpose of banks in a capital-
ist economy. Finance is an intermediary good: You cannot
eat it, experience it, or physically use it. The purpose of
finance is to support other activities in the economy. Banks
are meant to allocate capital (funds) to the best possible
use. In a capitalist economy, this means allocating money
to the people or entities that will create the greatest wealth
for the overall society. At the same time, risk management
is supposedly a primary skill for bankers. When capital is
allocated well and available to wealth creating entities, so-
cieties flourish. When capital is poorly allocated, economies
can collapse.” [16]
12“Wealth, as Mr Hobbes says, is power. But the person
who either acquires, or succeeds to a great fortune, does not
necessarily acquire or succeed to any political power, either
civil or military. His fortune may, perhaps, afford him the
means of acquiring both; but the mere possession of that
fortune does not necessarily convey to him either. The power
which that possession immediately and directly conveys to
him, is the power of purchasing a certain command over all
the labour, or over all the produce of labour which is then
in the market. His fortune is greater or less, precisely in
proportion to the extent of this power, or to the quantity
either of other men’s labour, or, what is the same thing, of
the produce of other men’s labour, which it enables him to
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talist the authority or permission to commandeer
part of the pool of social labour to his project.
In this sense the provision of a line of credit by
a bank is like any other official act of giving per-
mission. It is like for example a building control
office issuing a permit allowing a house to be built.
But the right to hand out such permissions does
not make the person handing them out productive.
It is bricklayer’s and carpenters that actually
produce the house, not the bureaucrat who signs
it off. When such permissions are in demand, the
official handing them out may ask for a cut: “You
want to have this house built, you know your ap-
plication might go much more smoothly were you
to show your generosity in some way”. In an anal-
ogous fashion bankers ask for their cut: interest.
It may appear that a loan to a builder, unlike
a building permit, actually gives the resources to
build a house but this is an illusion generated by
the legal relations underwhich it is done. The loan
does not give the resources to proceed. The means
are bricks and workers, the loan gives the right to
command these, this is again the removal of a legal
impediment in that a private citizen can not print
their own money or issue generally acceptable cred-
its to authorise the work, whilst banks, unlike other
agents, can do this without legal impediment. The
right to command labour is in the end a juridical
relation, a more complex and indirect one than that
given by a building warrant, but still ultimately a
legal one backed in the end by the acceptance by
the tax authorities of drafts on the private bank.
The fact that the bank holds an account with the
state bank is what ultimately gives the bank an
ability to issue the authority to command labour.
This is in the end a legal delegation of authority by
the state.
At one time the charging of interest (usury) as
regarded as the moral equivalent of an official tak-
ing a bribe. With the rise of bankers to political
dominance, their very wealth, obtained in this way
comes to be seen as a token of social respectabil-
ity.13
purchase or command.”[26, ch. 5].
13“This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the
rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect
persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both
to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the
order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most
universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments.
1.5 Contradiction between real and
formal appropriation of value
Why do capitalists seek profits?
On the one hand it is something that is imposed
by the nature of competition. Only profitable firms
survive, the more profitable they are the more likely
they are to survive, so a mechanism analogous to
natural selection establishes the profit motive as
the driving force of the system.
But there is another way of looking at this.
Whatever its historical form – gold, banknotes,
bank accounts – money has been the power of com-
mand over labour. In all class societies, members
of the upper class had been driven to increase their
power over the labouring classes.
Slave owners tried to obtain as many slaves as
they could. Feudal landowners sought to do this
indirectly by building up their landed estates, since
attached to the land were serfs. Capitalists do it by
accumulating money. A billion Euros gives a cap-
italist command over about 100,000 person years
of labour, say 2000 working lifetimes of indirect
labour in commodities, perhaps twice that if they
employ people directly. The more money you have,
the more people are at your command.
Building up a bank balance gives you a symbolic
command over lots of future labour but this is dif-
ferent from really having the product of this labour,
as the fable of Midas long ago pointed out. By the
nature of credit, a thrifty symbolic appropriator
depends for his very existence on the spendthrift
debtors.
The credit system socialises this dependence,
makes it impersonal, so that money seems to simply
represent abstract value, abstract command over
labour. But the labour it is command over, is that
of the debtor classes as a whole. The sub-prime cri-
sis, like all credit crises, brings to the fore the fragile
and mirage-like quality of this symbolic command,
which can grow beyond any possibility of conver-
sion into a real appropriation.
Think back to the phase diagram. The symbolic
wealth of the rentier classes is the tadpoles tail. As
That wealth and greatness are often regarded with the re-
spect and admiration which are due only to wisdom and
virtue; and that the contempt, of which vice and folly are the
only proper objects, is often most unjustly bestowed upon
poverty and weakness, has been the complaint of moralists
in all ages.” [25, p. 53]
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it wiggles and extends, it drives the head towards
the right towards the wall of bankruptcy (Figure 3).
Hit the wall and the credit creation operator a†
becomes its terrible twin the anihilation operator a
which cancels out the debt of the bankrupt at the
same time as it wipes out the asset of the creditor.14
Figure 3: Capitals pushed against the wall of
bankruptcy lead to debt/credit annihilation.
2 Nonconservation laws of
capital accumulation
If the characteristic or signature of commodity ex-
change, C → M → C, implies a conservation law,
then the signature of capital,
M → C →M ′,
breaks that conservation as M ′ = M + ∆M de-
notes an increase in the money above the initial
sum spent on commodities in productionM . Marx
famously attempted to explain how such expansion
is possible [20, ch. 5-6]. It could not, he argued,
come about in the sphere of commodity exchange,
since this was governed by a law of conservation
of values. Thus, he argued, profit ∆M could only
be explained outside the realm of commodity ex-
change, by the extraction of surplus labour in the
production process: Within capitalist firms – where
Freedom, Equality and Bentham do not prevail –
the working day is extended beyond the time re-
quired to produce the workers’ means of consump-
tion, in order to provide a surplus that funds prof-
its.
If one takes the aggregate of all capitalist firms,
the signature of this process can be represented as
M → [C ⇒ (C +∆C)]→M ′, (4)
14 We admit to ‘coquetting’ with Dirac in our terminology
as Marx admitted to doing with Hegel.
where C ⇒ (C + ∆C) represents the production
process that generates a physical surplus product
∆C after the consumption of the present working
population has been met. Moreover, through the
compulsion of market dependency capitalist firms
seek an indefinite expansion
M → C →M ′ → C′ →M ′′ → C′′ →M ′′′ → · · ·
by reinvesting the profit in greater productive ca-
pacity. This process is therefore governed by non-
conservative laws of exponential growth. Relative
growth rates are measured as per unit of time, i.e.,
[time−1], and a small change in such a rate may pro-
duce dramatic differences over time. For instance,
if some quantity grows at 1% per annum it dou-
bles in size approximately every 70 years. But if it
grows at 10% per annum it doubles every 7 years.
As we show below, the nonconservative laws of
capital accumulation interacts with systems outside
the capitalist sector which provide it with labour,
natural resources and the material conditions for
habitability in general.
2.1 Profit rate constraints
Capitalist firms reinvest their profit – and rentiers
finance expansion in various branches of produc-
tion – based on the rate of return on the capital
invested. Consider a firm i earning annual profit
flow of Pi Euros per annum, before interest, rents
and tax expenditure, with a stock of fixed capital
Ki Euros invested in the form of buildings, ma-
chines, equipment etc. The firm then earns an an-
nual profit rate Ri = Pi/Ki on its capital stock
and the dimension of this rate is [time−1]. If new
investment in the firm is to be attractive, the profit
rate should exceed the real interest rate or else it
would be more profitable to simply earn interest on
saved profits.15
Next, consider the aggregate of all capitalist
firms in the economy. The total capital stock in-
vested earns different rates of profit in various firms
and branches as illustrated in Figure 4. Due to
varying technical conditions in production and the
random churning of the market, the distribution
will always be dispersed. The process of finan-
cial polarisation of capital into net creditors and
debtors, described in the previous section, will also
15As pointed out by Marx and Keynes [23].
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Figure 4: The distribution of the total capital stock
over various profit rate brackets. The red-shaded
area signifies the proportion of the capital that
makes a direct loss. The dashed horizontal line
indicates the profit rate earned when averaged over
all capital.
increase the dispersion of profit rates after net inter-
est payments. Firms with higher levels of net debt
will have lower retained profit rates, whereas firms
accumulating credit accounts experience higher re-
tained profit rates.
Further, as (4) signifies, the aggregate profit flow
is predicated on the production of a surplus product
of commodities which requires an annual flow of
labour L expended in production,
M → [C ⇒ (C +∆C)]→M ′
↑
L
(5)
On the basis of the Law of Large Numbers it
can then be shown that average profit rate over all
capital invested, denoted R, is well approximated
by
R = ρ
L
K
(approx.), (6)
where L denotes aggregate labour expended per
unit of time, K denotes the labour time required
to reproduce the total capital stock, and ρ is the
fraction of surplus labour-time performed above the
consumption of the workforce [11].
The significance of the average profit rate R is
that it constrains the entire distribution of profit
rates in the capitalist sector as illustrated in Figure
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Figure 5: The distribution of profit rates is de-
formed as the average profit rate R declines from
20% to 5% per annum. Note that the latter distri-
bution is compressed as the proportion of directly
loss-making capital increases and eventually goes
bankrupt.
5. Further, it sets the upper limit to the growth rate
of the total capital stock. The average profit rate
rises when the amount of labour expended grows
faster than the labour-value of the total capital
stock, and vice versa.
The amount of labour time required to reproduce
the capital stock, K, is lowered by productivity
growth gP and the rate of depreciation d, but rises
as the surplus product assumes the form of capital
goods invested in production. Based on this insight
it is possible to derive a dynamic equilibrium of the
average profit rate,
R∗ =
gL + gP + d
λ
, (7)
where gL denotes the relative growth rate of labour
expended and λ the ratio of aggregate gross invest-
ments to total profits.16 In words, the evolution of
the average profit rate is constrained by the balance
between the proportion of profit that is reinvested,
on the one hand, and depreciation, productivity
growth and the growth of labour, on the other.
For sake of illustration, suppose the expenditure
of labour and productivity in the capitalist sector
16The derivation is based on computing the relative
growth R˙/R = ρ˙/ρ + gL − K˙/K, and solving for R when
R˙ = 0, cf. [34, 6].
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Figure 6: Average profit rate R and the equilibrium profit rate R∗, USA and UK 1964-2008. The red
dotted curve shows contribution from investments λ and depreciation d alone. The green dash-dotted
curve shows the additional contribution from productivity growth gP . The blue dashed curve shows the
additional contribution from the growth of labour gL. Source: [19] and own calculations.
grows by 2% per annum and 3% per annum, re-
spectively. If the aggregate depreciation rate is 10%
per annum and the ratio of investments to profits
is 0.60, then the average profit rate is inexorably
driven to 25% per annum, irrespective of the distri-
bution between profits and wages! Figure 6 shows
how the trajectory of the average profit rate in the
USA and UK have been constrained by the equi-
librium profit rate.
2.2 Resource constraints
The signature of capital (4) illustrates that the cap-
italist sector is dependent on an element produced
outside its units of production, namely the capacity
to work, which provides a flow of labour, L, into the
production process. But there are more such ele-
ments. In fact, the process involves an annual flow
of any natural resource N expended in production,
M → [C ⇒ (C +∆C)]→M ′
↑
N
(8)
This includes important inputs such as oil, scarce
minerals and arable land. Let gN denote the growth
rate of expenditure and gβ denote the rate of regen-
eration, both relative to the stock of a particular
natural resource. Then gN − gβ is the relative de-
pletion rate of the stock of that resource. Provided
the depletion rate is not too rapid, alternative in-
puts and technologies can be found; otherwise the
rising scarcity of resource deposits require increas-
ing inputs of labour in extraction per unit, which
lowers productivity of labour gP . It may also re-
quire a higher fraction of profits reinvested in fixed
capital to sustain such extraction. From (7) we see
that such pattern of development would lower the
equilibrium profit rate.
2.3 Emission constraints
Finally, the capitalist sector does not only absorb
labour and natural resources from outside, but pro-
duces emissions that deteriorate the conditions for
habitability. For an annual flow of any particular
emission E from production, we can illustrate this
as
M → [C ⇒ (C +∆C)]→M ′
↓
E
(9)
The most critical emission is greenhouse gases, in
particular carbondioxide CO2. Let gE denote the
growth rate and gα denote the rate of absorption of
the emission, both relative to the stock of accumu-
lated emissions. When the relative emission rate,
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gE − gα, is positive, the pollution level is rising.
This acts negatively on the productivity of labour
in the agricultural sector, which again would lower
the equilibrium profit rate (7). Furthermore, for a
given living standard, it would necessitate an in-
creasing share of labour expended in the produc-
tion of wage-goods consumed by the population as
well as in pollution management. Such a pattern
of development would reduce the relative surplus
appropriated by the capitalist classes.
2.4 Contradictions of exponential
accumulation
In summary, the competitive dynamics arising from
capitalist property relations subject the firms to
the compulsion of exponential accumulation. The
capitalist sector as a whole is thus geared towards
an indefinite accumulation of resources – natural
and human – in the form of productive assets and
commodities. With finite resources the exponential
growth path must continuously hit constraints that
need to be overcome for further accumulation. To
an individual rentier such constraints may appear
irrelevant; indeed there is no tangible resource limit
to continuously growing profit income in the form
of increasing symbols in a bank account or on pa-
per bills. These symbols, however, command real
material resources embodied in goods and services.
In the world-historic conjuncture of the twenty-
first century each constraint – labour L, natural re-
sources N and emissions E – presents obstacles on
a scale that cannot be circumvented by the private
capitalist sector alone but would ultimately require
massive state intervention and an increasing public
appropriation of the social surplus.
First, as the length of the working day can only
be extended to a certain limit, exponential growth
of labour time expended in the capitalist sector
is ultimately constrained by demographic factors.
Once labour reserves from the countryside have
been absorbed, the growth rate gL is ultimately set
by the rate of population growth. Further, as so-
cieties industrialise the net cost of rearing children
brings the natural population growth rate close to
zero, and is compensated only by net immigration
in certain countries. In the advanced capitalist
world as a whole the growth rate of employment
was hovering just below 1% per annum, prior to
the recent crisis. The trend in East Asia was sim-
ilar, just above 1% per annum.17 Southern Asia,
the Middle East and Northern Africa will experi-
ence the same trend if the regions follow the path
of industrialisation and urbanisation.
The equilibrium profit rate (7) tells us that the
growth of labour gL therefore ceases to be a source
of profitability, it is rather the specific balance of in-
vestments λ and productivity growth gP that can
sustain conditions for average profitability in the
capitalist sector. This depends on the specific tech-
nological phase of an economy and its institutional
structure of investments. If the technological condi-
tions are not favourable, the capitalist class is bet-
ter off dissipating a greater fraction of the surplus
product in the form of luxury consumption rather
than reinvesting profits in the productive capital
stock. Only public enterprises that operate accord-
ing to break-even criteria, rather than rate of return
on capital investment, will undertake large-scale in-
vestments under such conditions. Short of such
commitments by the state under rentier-dominated
capitalism, the unproductive pattern has sustained
mass unemployment in the advance capitalist coun-
tries since the 1980s [27].
Second, the competitive and anarchic dynamics
of the capitalist sector inexorably drive firms to
exploit energy sources and materials that can sat-
isfy the compulsion of exponential accumulation; if
only over a short time horizon. The early capitalist
factory system that arose in England was initially
powered by water. But the supply of labour was
concentrated in populous towns; hence factories
that employed more mobile steam-engines could
establish there and get a competive edge. Unlike
the water wheel, steam-engines were powered by a
scarce fossil fuel: coal. This was the genesis of fossil
fuels as the primary source of energy in capitalism
[18]. Further, exponential accumulation must be
met by exponential consumption for profits to be
realised. This does not only increase the scale of
material inputs but also reduces arable land and
fresh water supplies.
Misallocation of critical scarce resources through
the market mechanism can thus only be counter-
acted by state intervention to bring down the de-
pletion rates to viable levels, i.e., imposing quotas
and a controlled scale of extraction. Further the
17The crisis has of course brought down the growth rate
even further, cf. [14].
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composition of consumption among higher-income
populations would need to be steered away from
material goods and towards sustainable services,
including socialised forms of consumption. Public
taxation as well as lower workhours provide mech-
anisms for changing consumption patterns.
Third, emissions of greenhouse gases impose seri-
ous risks of deteriorating the viability of the global
capitalist economy. Under current global emission
trends the average world temperature will increase
beyond +2 degrees Celsius by the year 2050, and
rapidly approaching +4◦C. The effects of such cli-
matic changes are an increased frequency of heat
waves; decline in crop yields; exacerbated water
scarcity; high-intensity tropical cyclones; and irre-
versible loss of biodiversity with unpredictable ef-
fects on human life [30]. All of which undermine the
reproduction of the source of value – the workforce.
The bulk of emissions in the global economy,
about one quarter, arises in electricity and heat, fol-
lowed by industry, transport and agriculture. De-
forestation further exacerbates this by reducing the
absorption rate [13]. Reducing per capita emissions
at a sufficient rate to counteract global warming re-
quires large-scale investments in power generation
and an energy-efficient transformation of the assets
in production, transport and housing. This is well
beyond the what private research and development
in the capitalist sector can commit to alone. As
the material conditions deteriorate, a coordinated
effort by states akin to wartime planning will be-
come increasingly necessary to sustain a viable pro-
ductive sector and workforce.
3 Contradictions between
laws of market exchange
and capital accumulation
We now consider the dynamics that arise from the
interaction between the conservative laws of market
exchange and the nonconservative laws of capital
accumulation.
3.1 Value conservation and the sig-
nature of capital
Marx only partly answered the problem of “where
the money comes from” in the process M → C →
M ′ = M +∆M . He explained how capitalists ob-
tained a net income from their capital, but this was
only half the problem. If the capitalists follow the
maxim ascribed to them by Marx – “Accumulate,
accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!” –
then the signature of capital M → C → M ′ ex-
tends into
M → C →M ′ → C′ →M ′′ → C′′ →M ′′′ → · · ·
which requires exponential growth in the quantity
of money. In the 19th century, the British economy,
like most others, depended on precious metal for
its monetary base. An exponential growth in the
quantity of money implies the same sort of growth
for gold stock. But if we look at historical data for
the growth of the world gold stock, we find that
during the 19th century it was growing at well un-
der 1% per annum. Given that the British economy
grew at over 2% a year, there was a discrepancy
between the growth of gold and the growth of com-
modity circulation.
Table 1: Growth of the world gold stock, 1840 to
2000. Reproduced from [6]
Stock Annual growth
Period (million troy oz.) (percent)
1840–1850 617.9 0.27
1851–1875 771.9 0.89
1876–1900 953.9 0.85
1901–1925 1430.9 1.64
1926–1950 2130.9 1.61
1951–1975 3115.9 1.53
1976–2000 4569.9 1.54
Since gold stocks could not grow fast enough to
support the expansion of the economy, capitalists
had to resort to commercial bills. An Iron Master
taking delivery of coal would typically write a bill
of exchange, a private certificate of debt, promising
to pay within 30 or 90 days.
Payment of wages would generally have to be
done in cash. Capitalists have tried at times to
pay wages in tokens redeemable only at company
stores (‘scrip’) but legislation by the state, eager to
maintain its monopoly of coinage if not to defend
the interests if the workers, tended to put a stop
to this. Payment in cash represents a transfer from
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the safes of capitalists to the pockets of their em-
ployees, with a corresponding cancellation of wage
debts. At the end of the week, the wage debt has
been cleared to zero, and there has been an equal
and compensating movement of cash.
Workers then spend their wages on consumer
goods. For the sake of simplicity, assume that there
is no net saving by workers so that in the course of
the week all of the money they have been paid is
spent. This implies that immediately after pay-day,
the money holdings of the workers are equal to one
week’s wages. If these wages were paid in coin this
would have set a lower limit to the quantity of coin
required for the economy to function.
When workers spend their wages on consumer
goods they transfer money only to those firms who
sell consumer goods – shopkeepers, inn-keepers and
so on. We can expect these firms not only to make
up the money they had paid out in wages, but to
retain a considerable surplus. The final sellers of
consumer goods will thus end up with more money
than they paid out in wages. From this extra cash
they can afford to redeem the bills of exchange that
they issued to their suppliers.
In the absence of bank credit, suppliers of manu-
factured consumer goods would be entirely depen-
dent for cash on money arriving when the bills of
exchange, in which they had initially been paid,
were eventually redeemed by shopkeepers and mer-
chants. The payment situation facing raw materi-
als firms was even more indirect: they could not be
paid unless the manufacturers had sufficient cash
to redeem bills of exchange issued for yarn, coal,
grain, etc.
The process of trade between capitalists leads to
the build-up of inter-firm debt. We suggest that
the total volume of inter-firm debt that could be
stably supported would have been some multiple
of the coinage available, after allowing for that re-
quired to pay wages. If one takes the aggregate of
all firms the ideal signature of this process can be
represented as:
M → [C ⇒ (C +∆C)]→M +∆M
where [C ⇒ (C + ∆C)] represents the production
process that generates a physical surplus of com-
modities after the consumption needs of the present
working population has been met. If there is no new
issue of coin by the state then the ∆M cannot be
‘real money’; rather, it must be in the form of bills
of exchange and other inter-firm credit.
For the capitalist class considered as a whole this
should not be a problem since the ∆M is secured
against the accumulated commodity surplus ∆C.
There is a net accumulation of value as commodi-
ties, and accounting practice allows both the debts
owed to a firm and stocks of commodities on hand
to be included in the value of its notional capital.
As the process of accumulation proceeds in this way
the ratio of commercial debt to real money will
rise. If the period for which commercial credit is
extended remains fixed – say at 90 days – then a
growing number of debts will be falling due each
day. If these have to be paid off in money, then a
growing number of firms will have difficulty meet-
ing their debts in cash.
The basic contradiction between capital’s expo-
nentially growing need for money and the much
slower growth of gold production led to a series of
transformations of the monetary system during the
19th and 20th centuries.18
1. Gold was supplemented by commercial credit.
This displaced gold from transactions between
capitalists.
2. Commercial credit was supplemented by the
discounting of bills of exchange by the banks.
3. Payment in bills of exchange was largely re-
placed by payments by cheque and commercial
credit by bank credit.
4. Gold coins were withdrawn from circulation to
be replaced by banknotes with gold only used
in settlements between international banks.
This meant that wage payments no longer de-
pended on precious metal.
18“One of the principal costs of circulation is money itself,
being value in itself. It is economised through credit in three
ways. A. By dropping away entirely in a great many trans-
actions. B. By the accelerated circulation of the circulating
medium. ... On the one hand, the acceleration is techni-
cal; i.e., with the same magnitude and number of actual
turnovers of commodities for consumption, a smaller quan-
tity of money or money tokens performs the same service.
This is bound up with the technique of banking. On the
other hand, credit accelerates the velocity of the metamor-
phoses of commodities and thereby the velocity of money
circulation. C. Substitution of paper for gold money.” [21,
ch. 27]
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5. National currencies were then completely re-
moved from the gold standard, and state notes
became the base money. This was completed
by the withdrawal of the dollar from the gold
standard in the 1970s.
6. With the development of computerisation in
the third quarter of the 20th century it be-
came practical to pay wages directly into bank
accounts. This meant that state base money
circulating could be substantially less than the
monthly or weekly wage bill.
7. Finally with the general issue of credit cards,
the credit system spread from the capitalist
class to all classes in society.
When money was still gold, this gold was value –
it was embodied labour and had a value interna-
tionally because in all countries the production of
gold required a great deal of labour. With the mod-
ern system of national and supernational currencies
money is no longer value. No significant work goes
into the printing of 100 Euro notes. Why then can
they function the same way that gold used to?
Central bank notes used to be issued under the
gold standard, but these were just tokens for gold,
and could be redemed for bullion on demand at the
central bank. There is no promise by the ECB to
redeem Euros to gold at any fixed exchange rate.19
Since there is no definite link between the Euro
and gold or between the Pound and gold, how can
these currencies function as a measure of value and
medium of exchange?
Why are they worth anything?
Well for one thing they are legal tender, but what
does this mean and why is it important?
Throughout the Eurozone the following is held to
apply in cases where a payment obligation exists:
• Mandatory acceptance of Euro cash; a
means of payment with legal tender sta-
tus cannot be refused by the creditor of
a payment obligation, unless the parties
have agreed on other means of payment
19Though collectively the central banks of the Euro area
held over 430 billion Euros in gold reserves. These can po-
tentially be used in settlement with other central banks to
settle foreign trade debts, but in practice there is little or no
intervention by the ECB using gold to support the value of
the Euro.
• Acceptance at full face value; the mon-
etary value of a means of payment with
legal tender status is equal to the amount
indicated on the means of payment
• Power to discharge from payment obli-
gations; a debtor can discharge himself
from a payment obligation by transferring
a means of payment with legal tender sta-
tus to the creditor. [1]
The circulation of the Euro is legally enforced in
the relationship between shops and customers, but
between businesses they can in principle both agree
to settle obligations in something other than Euros.
But with retail commerce and all taxes payable in
Euros, its circulation is effectively enforced.
But there is a difference between the previous
generation of state monies like the Franc or D-mark
and the Euro. The previous generation fell into the
general category of state token monies. This is a
very old category of money [15, 17, 31]. Precious
metal money was prevalent in early modern Eu-
rope. But in China the monetary system was from
a much earlier stage based either on copper tokens
or on paper notes [28, 29] and it is arguable that
for much of the Roman Empire the Denarius was
little more than a copper token with merely a sym-
bolic coating of silver [4]. In such a system the
circulation of money goes illustrated in table 2.
The empire or state imposes the circulation of
its token currency by obliging the producers to pay
taxes in money. Since the producers must ‘render
unto Ceasar’, they are forced to sell their prod-
uct to the employees of Ceasar. The state creates
money tokens with which it pays its employees.
The state employees willingly work for the state
in return for these tokens knowing that these to-
kens will enable them to command the labour of
others in their turn. The state thus breaks down
the self-sufficient or barter economies of the coun-
tryside and enforces the spread of commodity ex-
change. Forestater gives a dramatic account of how
this process was enforced in the British Empire [12].
In a pre-monetary tax system, the tax is levied
in the form of a direct duty on the population to
work for or deliver goods to the state. In this case
the real appropriation of labour by the state is di-
rectly visible. In a monetary tax system with to-
ken money the real appropriation of surplus labour
occurs when soldiers and other state employees de-
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Table 2: Circulation of money
State Pay Lackeys Purchases Producers Tax State
Emperor/ Emperor/
King → Soldiers → Artisans → King
↑ Bureacrats Peasants ↓
տ ← ← ւ
liver goods and services to the Emperor. There is
a distinct formal or symbolic appropriation when
the taxes are levied on the producers. This is simi-
lar to the relationship that we previously analysed
between formal and symbolic appropriation in the
credit system, but with this difference: the formal
transfer in the tax system has no pretence of equiv-
alence.
The value of a state token money is based on
something historically prior to commodity produc-
tion, something that goes right back to the earliest
state forms: the power of the state to command the
labour of its inhabitants. The value of the Swedish
Krona is set by the fact that the Swedish state
(Crown) directly or indirectly appropriates more
than half the labour in the Kingdom.20 The sum
in Krona paid out for that directly social labour
has its value set by this labour that the Crown di-
rectly commands. This rate of exchange between
royal tokens and labour sets the monetary equiv-
alent of labour time in Sweden, which then oper-
ates via the medium of commodity trade within
the remaining private part of the economy. The di-
rect royal command over the labour of his subjects
is then symbolically appropriated by the capitalist
class in the form of Krona credits in the Svenska
Handelsbanken, etc. to give them command over
the privately employed working class.
For a monetary system like this to work, you need
a clearly defined and controlled territory of the em-
pire, an efficient tax system, and a state that com-
mands a substantial portion of the total labour of
society. And that state has to have the sovereign
right to issue its own currency. These conditions
are not met in the Eurozone.
20This is a slight simplification, public expenditure is over
53% of GNP, but a part of that is indirect appropriation
of labour as social protection, where individual citizens are
paid social benefits in Krona.
3.2 Formation of interest
The formation of credit and debt relations in the
capitalist sector demands further an analysis of the
formation of interest in the banking system. The
specific feature of this system is deposit taking.
A deposit-taking banker is in a perilous position
since he accepts cash over and above his own capital
which he then lends out. Because he has lent out
cash that was not his own capital, and is under an
obligation to encash deposits on demand (or after
some fixed warning period), he can easily become
insolvent. The remaining cash he holds in his safe
is never enough to meet his maximum obligation to
his creditors. Should the day dawn on which too
many of them demand their money back, he is lost.
Suppose we model this as a stream of customers
arriving at the banker’s till at random intervals.
Each customer either makes a deposit or a with-
drawal. The customers may make a withdrawal
of any amount up to their current credit balance.
We further assume that in a steady state customers
are as likely to make a deposit as to make a with-
drawal. Then the more customers that a bank has,
the smaller will be the proportional variation in the
withdrawals from day to day.
As the number of customers rises, the variation
in the amount withdrawn in any week falls, and
so too does the maximum withdrawal that can be
expected. A very small bank would have to keep
all its deposits in the safe as an insurance against
having to pay them out, but a bank with 20,000
customers might never see more than a few percent
of its cash deposits withdrawn in any week. A bank
with that number of customers could safely issue
as loans several times as much in paper banknotes
as the coin that it held in its vaults, safe in the
knowledge that the probability of it ever having
to pay out that much in one day was vanishingly
small. Thus with a starting capital of 10 million
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Figure 7: Example PDF of maximum excursion W
of a bank’s reserves during a year. Shaded area
gives the probability of withdrawals W between 2
and 3 million Euros.
the bank could lend out 200 million after building
up its network of customers. This creation of new
paper money by the banks was the hidden secret
behind the signature of capital.
The cost to a bank of making a loan is related to
the likelihood that the reserves left after the loan
will be too small to cover fluctuating withdrawals.
If this happens the bank may lose its capital.
Let W denote the maximal excursion of reserves
from their mean position during a year, due to ran-
dom deposits and withdrawals by customers. Let
us assume that W follows a Gaussian distribution,
with a standard deviation of 1 million Euros. Sup-
pose that the banker had a capital of 5,000,000 and
that he would lose his capital if the bank failed.
Then, if he started with reserves of 3 million, mak-
ing a loan of 1 million would reduce the reserves
to 2 million and the loan would have an expected
cost of 5, 000, 000 × Pe, where Pe is the probabil-
ity that the withdrawals W exceed the resulting
reserve level after the loan.21 Figure 7 illustrates
this. This amounts to an expected cost of about
107,000, which sets a lower limit on the interest it
would be rational for the banker to charge for the
loan, namely 10.7% in this case.
Different banks will charge different rates of in-
terest, but through the pressures of bankruptcies
the lower safety rate is likely to emerge from cap-
italist banking practices. As the ratio of reserves
21In other words, Pe = Pr{−3 million < W ≤
−2 million} ≈ 0.022 for a zero-mean Gaussian variable W
with standard deviation σ = 1 million.
to deposits fall, this pressure would be reflected in
higher interest rates. There would thus be an in-
verse relationship between the reserve to deposit
ratio and the interest rate.
At the birth of the banking system the reserves of
the private banks were in bullion. Now the reserves
are in the form of credit accounts with the state
bank. These come into existence when the state
pays people for services rendered, or makes state
grants. One of the authors recalls that his student
grant, and payments for attending Research Coun-
cil meetings were in the form of bits of paper that
looked like cheques but instead of being drawn on a
bank, they were drafts made out on ‘The Queen and
Lord Treasurer’s Remembrancer’. Private banks
can present these government drafts to the Bank of
England, and have their account with the Bank of
England credited by a like amount.
The other side of the coin is when a citizen pays
taxes to the Exchequer using a cheque drawn on
a commercial Bank. The Exchequer then passes
these to the Bank of England which writes down
the credit account of the relevant commercial bank.
If B are the reserves of the private banking sys-
tem, it follows that dB
dt
= G − T − S where G is
government payments, T are tax payments and S is
the sale of government securities, all per unit time.
Sales of government securities obviously reduce the
monetary reserves of the private banking system.
By adjusting its sales of securities, the state can
manipulate the reserves of the private banking sys-
tem and thus control the rate of interest. In a state
with its own central bank, it is an illusion to think
that the government is at the mercy of the ‘money
market’ when selling these securities. A state where
G > T , i.e., one with a budget deficit can if it wishes
simply refrain from selling securities for a while and
in due course the growth of the reserves of the pri-
vate banks will force a fall in the market interest
rate. In the end, the private banks are forced to
buy government debt. Any reserves exceeding the
level required for the safety of their loans to the
private sector are simply dead assets, yielding no
income. The only way for the banking system as
a whole to get income from these assets is to buy
government securities.
If the state bank wishes, it can buy back govern-
ment securities from the private banks forcing the
interest rate down even faster. This is the mech-
anism by which so-called Quantitative Easing re-
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duces the interest rate.
3.3 Dynamics of sector balances
The reader may recall equation (2) showed that
the sum of borrowing and lending have to bal-
ance. That equation was defined over all agents,
but it also applies if, instead of agents, we con-
sider economic sectors: households, non-financial
companies, banks, the state, and the ‘rest of the
world’. Figure 8 illustrates these sector balances
for the USA and UK. In Table 3 we present such
data for the Eurozone. Now the sum of the sectoral
balances have to equal 0. Look at the business sec-
tor you can see that, as for most years, this sector
was running a financial surplus. This surplus was
only possible because of the deficits, i.e., borrowing,
by the household and state sectors. After the sub-
prime mortgage crisis lending to working-class and
middle-class borrowers became much more restric-
tive and the household sector became net lenders.
This does not mean that the working class became
net lenders of course, it is just that the propertied
and working classes are aggregated in the house-
hold sector statistics. Once working-class borrow-
ing fell, then the saving by the propertied classes
became the dominant factor in the household sec-
tor. This constrains the market for consumer goods
producing the recession.
The balances make it clear that the business sec-
tor can only run a financial surplus if other sectors
run a deficit, and given the poor competitive posi-
tion of US and UK manufacturing the rest of the
world is not going to run a deficit with them. That
leaves only the household or the state as possible
absorbers of the financial surplus of the corporate
sector.
The limitation of the financial system to sup-
port borrowing in 2008 had in the short term lit-
tle to do with profitability of industry, as it was
lending to working class households not to indus-
try. Their ability to borrow was constrained by
low wages. The repackaging of mortgages hid the
fact that a large portion of working class borrowers
were bound to default on their loans, but it could
only hide it for a while, eventually the poverty of
the working class borrowers became the determin-
ing factor. In longer term though one has to ask
why the corporate sector ran a financial surplus? In
other words, saving a portion of its profit income
rather than reinvesting?
The share of profits expended as net invest-
ments has rarely exceeded 25% in the advanced
economies, since the post-WWII boom [19]. We
would argue that this is a structural feature of a
modern capitalist economy. As the demographic
transition is completed and production technologies
mature, the growth rates of labour, gL, and produc-
tivity, gP , become moderated. Then it becomes in-
creasingly difficult to maintain average profitability
when firms are reinvesting a large portion of their
retained profits, as seen in equation (7). Fig. 9
illustrates the productivity growth required to sus-
tain average profitability at the post-WWII boom
levels, under the actual demographic and invest-
ment trends. Short of such such spectacular growth
rates, rapid capital accumulation is unsustainable
in the capitalist sector and a substantial portion
of profits will instead be accumulated as financial
surpluses and spent on luxury consumption.
4 The crisis in the Eurozone
From the standpoint of exchange being a conser-
vative system, the exponential growth of value im-
plied by compound interest has to be a temporary
disequilibrium phenomenon – tied to an exponen-
tial growth in whatever is the source of value. If the
expenditure of human energy is the source, then
the accumulation of capital value must depend on
a similar exponential growth of the working popu-
lation.
We know that historically the process of indus-
trialisation has combined rapid accumulations of
capital values with an exponential growth in the
working population. But we also know that soci-
eties undergo a demographic transition once they
have developed further – with a shift to zero or
negative rates of natural population growth. As we
have argued above, the end to population growth
is bound eventually to make the productive expan-
sion of capitalism unviable. Figure 10 illustrates
the trajectories of the average profit rates, and their
determinants, in the advanced economies of West-
ern Europe.
If we look at Western Europe and Japan, the nat-
ural rate of population growth is very low. In the
face of this constraint we see a set of displacement
processes:
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Figure 8: Trends in sectoral balances in US and UK. Reproduced from
http://www.concertedaction.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/US-Financial-Balances.png and .../UK-
Financial-Balances.png
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Figure 9: Actual net productivity growth gP and the growth g
∗
P required to sustain average profitability
at the level in 1964, under actual trends of demographics and investments. Using (7), g∗P = λR1964 −
(gL + d).
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Figure 10: Average profit rate R and the equilibrium profit rate R∗, in four major Western European
economies. Note that the contribution from the growth of labour gL is low or marginal. Source: [19]
and own calculations.
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1. Pressure of immigration from areas of high
birth rate. On the one hand this is what one
would expect simply as a diffusion process,
but there is also political ‘pressure’ by capital-
ists interests to reduce barriers to movement
of labour in order to allow continued capital
growth.
2. As it becomes harder to reinvest profits in
new labour employing activities, there is an in-
creasing dislocation between the apparent ac-
cumulation of capital in financial instruments
and the reality, in which the surplus product
is actually being socially used by the state.
There is a fundamental conflict between the at-
tempt to maintain a mechanism of symbolic ap-
propriation of the surplus by private owners and
the European demographic conditions which mean
that little real accumulation is now possible in the
private sector. The greater part of the social sur-
plus product now has really to be appropriated by
the state as representative of society. The contin-
uation of a private claim on this surplus becomes
actually infeasible. The conflict between an expo-
nential growth of financial claims and a stagnant
population upon whom those claims rest arguably
lies at the heart of the ‘Euro Crisis’.
4.1 Greek debt
For example we know that the Greek trade deficit
with Germany and the German trade surplus with
Greece must sum to zero. It is impossible to re-
duce one without reducing the other. If austerity
in Greece reduces their deficit with Germany, there
must be a reduction in German exports. If the ob-
jective is to reduce the trade imbalance between
Germany and Southern Europe, it would be better
to give Germans longer and better paid holidays so
that they could spend more on Mediteranean holi-
days rather than impoverishing both sides.
It is also helpful to look at the problem of state
debts this way. If at the end of a period the state is
to reduce its liabilities and improve its net worth,
this necessarily implies a reduction in the assets
held by the state’s creditors. How to reduce state
debt and how to impoverish the holders of state
debt are one and the same problem. In this light,
a choice of options become visible
• debts can simply be repudiated,
• inflation can be engineered to reduce the real
value of the debt,
• firms and individuals holding state bonds can
be relieved of them by the taxman,
In contrast to these direct measures, austerity im-
posed on the non-bondholding classes, is much less
effective. Since liabilities between sectors of an
economy must sum to zero, taxing those too poor
to save will only reduce state debt to the extent
that the poor are driven to take out increased per-
sonal loans. The increase in the liabilities of the
poor then compensates for the fall in state debt.
The poor, however, are not very credit worthy as
the sub-prime mortgage collapse showed.
4.2 The Stability Pact
The key measures to solve the Euro crisis accord-
ing to the treaty recently adopted by most of the
EU are to establish a balanced budget or a budget
surplus for the state sector.
BEARING IN MIND that the need for
governments to maintain sound and sus-
tainable public finances and to prevent a
general government deficit becoming ex-
cessive is of essential importance to safe-
guard the stability of the euro area as a
whole, and accordingly, requires the in-
troduction of specific rules, including a
‘balanced budget rule’ and an automatic
mechanism to take corrective action; [2,
p.2]
The Contracting Parties shall apply the
rules set out in this paragraph in addition
and without prejudice to their obligations
under European Union law: (a) the bud-
getary position of the general government
of a Contracting Party shall be balanced
or in surplus; [2, article 3]
The drafters of this treaty imagine that it is pos-
sible, by an act of international law to impose a
unilateral constraint on one item in a mutually de-
pendent complex of relations. The surplus or deficit
position of the government sector in the Eurozone
depends upon the net positions of all other sectors.
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Table 3: Sectoral balances in billion Euros for the Eurozone, 2012 Q1, extracted from the online database
of the ECB on 4 Aug 2012. http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/aggregates/sect/html/index.en.html
Households Nonfinancial Financial Govt. Rest of
companies companies world
Net surplus 48 22 39 –122 13
In Table 3 we reproduce in summary form the
latest data on the surplus deficit positions of all fi-
nancial sectors in the Eurozone. All sectors other
than the state sector run a surplus, i.e., they are
building up their financial assets. The change pro-
posed by the treaty is drastic. It proposes in effect
to wipe out all net financial transactions between
the sectors by changing the net borrowing position
of the general government sector from a quarterly
deficit of 122 billion Euros to a deficit of 0 or even
a net surplus.
But the implication of this would be that the
net savings of the household sector, the company
sector and the rest of the world would have to be
reduced to 0, effectively eliminating out all net fi-
nancial transactions as they exist today.
In the abstract this is possible. If by some means
the savings of the household sector could be com-
pletely eliminated, if the whole company sector
could be made to run at a break even position with
no net financial surplus, and if the Eurozone’s trade
deficit with the rest of the world could be wiped
out, then the government sector could run a bal-
anced budget.
At the level of accounting it is possible, but is
such a measure compatible with the continuation
of a functioning capitalist economy?
Suppose the governments attempt to achieve this
by austerity measures – essentially cutting public
expenditure. How does this affect each of the other
sectors?
4.2.1 Household sector
The ‘household sector’, is an amalgam of differ-
ent social classes. It includes households from the
propertied classes who are wealthy enough to have
a substantial financial surplus, but it includes far
more households who have little or no savings and
are more likely to be net debtors. The neo-liberal
government austerity measures in the EU today pri-
marily target those on low incomes who have no
financial surplus. As such they only have a slight
impact on the fiancial surplus of the household sec-
tor.
In principle, austerity measures that would re-
duce the financial surplus of the household sector
are possible: for instance steep increases in income
tax on higher incomes or a progressive tax on large
houses and landed property. The Stafford Cripps
austerity policies in the late 1940s were effective in
this way. Since such policies, e.g. top rates of in-
come tax above 90%, are not being followed, the
prospect of eliminating the financial surplus of the
personal sector is negligible.
4.2.2 Nonfinancial companies
In principle it would be possible, for a while at
least, for nonfinancial companies as a whole to run
without a financial surplus, or even with a finan-
cial deficit, if they were carrying out a large pro-
gramme of credit financed capital investment. But
this scenario is not very likely. Investment by nonfi-
nancial companies tends to be self-financing taken
across the sector as a whole. Investment by one
company may require external funding, but its pur-
chases boost the profits of suppliers, which means
that the sector as a whole tends to self-finance.
Firms will only voluntarily seek external finance
to expand if they anticipate a high rate of profit
on investment, which implies among other things a
rapidly expanding market for their products. It is
hard to see how this expanding market can be antic-
ipated during a period in which austerity measures
are curtailing consumer demand. Beyond that, the
rate of profit in Europe has only been held up since
the 1980s by a reduction in the accumulation rate.
An increased investment rate would thus be self-
curtailing.
Involuntary deficits by industrial and commercial
firms are of course possible in the short run when
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faced with a slump in demand. But their response
to this is likely to be to quickly cut costs by shed-
ding labour, so even involuntary deficits induced by
austerity would be short lived. Attempting to force
industrial and commercial companies as a whole to
run at break even point, which the treaty implies,
would mean, given the spread of rates of return
within the sector, putting a significant fraction of
them on the path to bankruptcy. This again is not
sustainable.
4.2.3 Financial companies
Table 3 shows that on an annual basis financial
companies in the Euro-zone are running a surplus
of some 160 billion Euros and that they are thus
responsible for 1
3
of the total deficit of the general
government sector.
There is almost nothing that the individual na-
tion state governments can do to eliminate this sur-
plus with the framework of the Euro-zone. Indeed
the whole thrust of economic policy in the capi-
talist world since the banking crisis broke out in
2008 has been to protect the interests of financial
companies. They could of course levy heavy taxes
on financial firms, but this is greatly complicated
by the location of the firms. The countries in the
Euro-zone whose governments are in the worst fi-
nancial position are not necessarily the ones whose
financial firms are running the biggest surpluses.
A general reduction of interest rates would cut
the surplus of the financial sector, but that, under
Euro system, is outwith the power of the nation
states. Only the ECB could systematically force
down interest rates by buying up national and local
governent bonds. This would reduce the cost of re-
financing and over time would, to an extent, reduce
the financial surplus of the private banking sector.
The whole structure of the treaties governing the
ECB has been designed by the financial sector to
prevent the ECB from acting in this way.
4.2.4 Rest of the world
The surplus of the rest of the world with the Euro-
zone might be reduced and even eliminated by neo-
liberal austerity measures. A sufficiently strong re-
cession in the Euro-zone might cut imports suffi-
ciently to eliminate the trade deficit of the zone
with the rest of the world. But this of course would
only succeed to the extent that the rest of the world
itself did not slip deeper into recession.
One effective tool that national governments
have traditionally been able to exercise is now out
of reach for the Eurozone. They can no longer de-
value to bring their trade back into balance. The
ECB again could force a devaluation were it to act
as the Bank of China used to, and systematically
buy up large quantities of dollar securities. But the
national governments can not instruct it to do so.
4.3 Conclusion on the Stability Pact
The structure set up under monetary union effec-
tively makes it impossible for national governments
to meet the obligations that they have undertaken
in the pact. Any serious attempt to impose bal-
anced budgets by austerity measures will be inef-
fective in its professed aim, and would as a side
effect engender a downward spiral of bankruptcies,
rising unemployment and deepening economic ruin.
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